

Ethnic Politics and the Politics of Accommodation

My object in this paper is to define 'ethnic politics', to show how ethnic politics is related to other kinds of politics, and to ask whether, as has been suggested by some authors, the experience of several small Western European states in reconciling non-ethnic communal divisions within a basically non-coercive democratic framework has applicability to situations of ethnically-based divisions.

There are four streams of recent political analysis which are especially relevant to these concerns. One is the work of people such as Rokkan, Dahl and Rose on the formation and structure of political cleavages in western societies. A second is the analysis of 'third world' countries within some variant of the 'plural society' concept of Furnivall and Smith. A third is work on international integration and unification (Etzioni, Haas, Deutsch), though the relevance of this to the others has not been sufficiently noted. (The EEC is more like Nigeria than the Organization of African Unity, surely; yet the Bibliography of Lindberg & Scheingold Regional Integration deals with the OAU but not loosely-integrated states.) The fourth is theoretical work on conflict, bargaining and coalition behaviour. On the whole these four lines have been pursued independently, at least to the extent that very few writers in one of these four areas seem aware of the significance and relevance of more than one of the four bodies of literature apart from the one in whose tradition he is working.

It may be helpful to explain at the outset the general ideas underlying what I have to say.

(1) Although there are pitfalls in applying a single word 'ethnicity' to, say, a Balkan nationality, a group with common national origins in a settler country and an 'African' 'people', there is a common element in terms of personal identity. The difficulty is of course derived from the fact that identity is a subjective matter and therefore one to which the standard Winchian-type anti-generalization arguments apply with maximum force. That is to say, if the kind of thing people identify with varies between, say, Eastern Europe, North America and West Africa, we do have a different phenomenon on our hands. On the other hand, the phenomenon of identification as a member of some 'nation' 'people' 'Volk' 'race' etc. is clearly deeply rooted in human psychology. In principle, therefore, we should be able to say something about the way in which politics changes if, for example, divisions based on religion or economic position are reinforced or crosscut by ethnic identities.

(2) At the same time we have to recognize that the strength of ethnic identification may range all the way from an overwhelming 'total identification' (as Mazrui has called it in Kuper and Smith Pluralism in Africa) to, relatively speaking, a vestigial trace, as with the various groups in the USA defined by their national origins in Europe, which in terms of identification with a 'people' is overlaid for nearly everyone by a national identification and then possibly

a sectional one (especially for Southerners). The political significance of ethnicity thus also varies roughly (though not of course exactly) concomitantly from, at one extreme, a line of political cleavage which dominates all others and along which even apparently unrelated issues get reconstructed, to, at the other end, a division of the population which has little political salience, in the sense that issues are neither framed nor are positions on them taken on the basis of advantage or disadvantage (material or other) to ethnic communities as such. The only issue with ethnic relevance may be the 'representational' issue i.e. the use of ethnic categories for filling political posts both elective and appointive - and the 'appointive' posts may include not just the civil service but directly-operated public services, public corporations, hospitals, universities and so on.

(3) At least at its lower end, it seems clear that ethnic politics bears a sufficient relationship to the politics of cleavages based on other communal categories like religion (or more generally 'spiritual families') so that an apparatus adequate to analyse the whole range of ethnic politics would also be able to deal with other kinds of communal politics. Notice that I'm not suggesting ethnic and other communal politics can simply be lumped together in a single undifferential category, as in Dahl's treatment (in Polyarchy) of what he calls 'sub-

cultural pluralism'. What I am saying is that some kinds of ethnic politics are like some kinds of other communal politics, so an adequate theory about the varieties of ethnic politics must have application to other forms of communal politics. Just to give one example, the use of criteria based on membership of a 'spiritual family' to allocate jobs, housing, even land reclaimed from the Zuider Zee, obviously has much in common with the allocation of similar goods on ethnically-based criteria elsewhere.

(4) The same line of argument can, I think, be pushed further, so as to extend to class politics. The point here is not that the line dividing communities (ethnic or 'spiritual') may coincide to a high degree with a line dividing landowner from labourers, landlords from tenants, workers from owners and managers, retailers from customers, debtors from creditors, etc. This is of course true, but if there were no more than that to it all one would need to say is that communal politics may simultaneously be class politics. The point that is relevant in the present context is that class politics may in some cases actually be communal politics in its own right, that is to say, either in the absence of any coinciding 'communal' line of division or at any rate analytically distinguishable from such a line. A Marxist 'class' in its fully-developed form would, I think, be a community. (18th Brumaire). The criteria are, as before, subjective. It's not

simply a matter of believing you're in the same boat as other workers so policies in favour of the working class will help you. The question is: do the members of a class think of themselves as an entity - and do others think of them as one? Do the members of it walk a little taller after one of their number has, say, won a sporting championship or feel ashamed when one has done something particularly shameful? Do they feel pleased when some section of their class has had a political or economic success even if they can expect no benefit from it themselves? And so on.

We must indeed recognize that class politics can take a communal form if we want to say that the 'spiritual families' of Belgium and the Netherlands are communities, since their secular component has been split since the late nineteenth century into liberal and socialist 'families'. Similarly, it would seem absurd to suggest that the two 'lager' of Austria - normally identified as Catholic and Socialist - should not be accepted in those terms. Of course, what makes these cases fit quite well into the 'spiritual family' category is that they are (or were in their palmy days) based on the ideology of socialism, but since socialism purports to be a class ideology, and does in fact appeal to working class people rather than middle class people, this still means that we are dealing with a class-based community.

Incidentally, when I say that the phenomena we're dealing with are subjective, I should perhaps make it clear that this refers to the defining characteristics. We of course expect that a sense of identification with a group will be correlated with structural regularities - high levels of association among members of the group compared with others, common institutions etc. We also, needless to say, expect that the more intense forms of communal identification will have observable behavioural consequences, including under certain conditions directly attributable political behaviour. Communal identification is, if you like, an intervening variable; but it is of course one on which we can get relatively direct information by looking both at what ideas are articulated in books, newspaper editorials, speeches, etc. and also what responses people give to survey questions.

In the seminar so far the only form of theoretical enterprise that has occurred has been that of drawing analogies - of saying that somewhere is like somewhere else. Now I don't wish to disparage this process. The beginnings of all systematic political science lie in the observation that places are like other places and different from others: 'Fire burns here as in Persia but the laws of Athens are different from the laws of Persia'. and analogies can not only prompt questions but also suggest answers. The trouble comes whenever

anyone tries to use analogies as more than a source of ideas to be followed up by other means. Because countries (or areas) differ in innumerable ways any statement that one situation is analogous to another in a certain respect entails some sort of implicit theory to the effect that certain conditions are common to the two and that these similar conditions give rise to similar outcomes while other conditions, some similar and others different, are irrelevant. At that point the discussion is liable to get out of hand and it is in the long run more rewarding to try to say explicitly what the theory is and start from there.

II

Let us begin with definitions. First 'ethnic'; then 'ethnic politics'.

The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology gives an obsolete (14C) meaning 'gentile, pagan' and a current (19C) meaning 'pertaining to race'. The etymology is 'Ecclesiastical Latin ethnicus (whence French ethnique) heathen - Greek ethnikós, f. éthnos nation (ecclesiastical Greek tà éthnē the nations, the Gentiles, rendering Hebrew gōyīm, pl. of gōy nation, esp. non-Israelitish nation.) I think the origin in a word meaning 'nation' is worth bearing in mind; the definition in terms of 'race' is itself a piece of frozen history. I suppose that nowadays if someone talks about 'race' we immediately think of skin colour and similar marked phenotypical differences. But right up to the end of the nineteen thirties the standard usage seems to have been to use 'race' to refer to what we would now call ethnic groups - English versus Welsh or Scots, the various European descent groups in North America and so on. For example, Robert Park, in 1939, wrote that 'when one speaks or writes in common parlance about the race problem in South Africa, it is to the relations existing between the English and the native Dutch or Afrianders that this expression refers'. (Race and Culture, p.82) The Canadian census figures in 1931 tabulated the population in terms of 'race' meaning Scots, English, French, etc. descent, and Porter (The Vertical Mosaic) quotes public figures in the nineteen

thirties still talking about 'racial stocks' from different parts have Europe being either 'good' or 'degenerate' and presupposing the heritability of quite precise traits. I imagine that we have to thank Adolf Hitler's 'final solution' for much of the unfashionability of this usage of 'race' but I also fear that it may be associated (partly as cause of the obsolescence of the other use and partly as consequence) with an increase in race consciousness of the phenotypical kind even beyond the levels previously reached in what have been called the 'white herrenvolk democracies'.

However, although ethnicity is not to be identified with 'race' in its contemporary usage, ethnicity is nevertheless closely related to descent, and this is one of the most important respects in which it is distinctive and not simply to be treated as a question of 'subcultural divisions'. Although there are of course exceptions the overwhelming fact is that a Jew is someone with a Jewish mother, an Arab someone with a Jewish father, a Pole (or a Polish-American) someone with Polish ancestry, and so on. Thus, inheritance is important whether or not the ethnic group is also recognized (perhaps against its will) as a 'racially distinctive' group.

Shibutani and Kwai, in their big book on Ethnic Stratification seem to me to deal with the whole question very sensibly. They point out that

the kind of usage of 'race' I quoted depends on the false belief that 'various modes of thought and action are ... inherited from one's ancestors , and blood is regarded as the medium through which these hereditary qualities are transmitted' (page 40). They go on to say that what is needed is 'a technical term to designate the popular distinctions without accepting the false beliefs on which they rest. Ideally suited for this purpose is the term ethnic, which corresponds roughly to what the German scholars mean by Volk; the term is used by anthropologists to refer to "a people". An ethnic group consists of people who conceive of themselves as being of a kind. They are united by emotional bonds and concerned with the preservation of their type. With very few exceptions they speak the same language, or their speech is at least intelligible to each other, and they share a common cultural heritage. Since those who form such units are usually endogamous, they tend to look alike. Far more important, however, is their belief that they are of common descent, a belief usually supported by myths or a partly fictitious history.'(40-41). They say a little later: 'This conviction that they are fundamentally alike enables people in some ethnic categories to become cohesive groups and to engage in effective concerted action. Men more easily believe they are alike when they think they are descended from the same ancestors. Inherited

attributes in themselves may not be important, for consciousness of kind may rest more upon a common culture. But what is presumed to be inherited is of decisive importance.' (Page 42) In summary 'an ethnic group consists of those who conceive of themselves as being alike by virtue of their common ancestry, real or fictitious, and who are so regarded by others.' They then illustrate the utility of the definition in relation to Jews, whose 'variety of physical characteristics' show them to be 'thoroughly mixed in ancestry' but who 'are people who conceive of themselves as descendants of common ancestors and are so identified by others' (Page 47). (There is some irony in treating Jews as the archetypal ethnic group when one recalls that etymologically the original meaning of 'ethnic' was 'gentile'.)

III

Ethnic politics exists insofar as issues of the following kind have political importance:

(1) The issue of the continued physical presence of the members of an ethnic group within the society -

(a) genocide

(b) expulsion

(c) secession i.e. territorial loss by the original state (either to form an independent state or join an existing one)

(2) The issue of the continued survival of an ethnic group as a culturally distinct entity, with its own language, religion, traditions, etc., and institutions facilitating the maintenance of them (e.g. especially schools).

(3) The issue of advantages and disadvantages not going to the survival of the ethnic group but inherently related to the specifying characteristics of the ethnic group e.g. the language or languages in which public administrators will deal with the public.

(4) Symbolic issues, involving the recognition of an ethnic group's position e.g. in relation to flags, public holidays, names for public buildings or streets, etc., or the minutiae of linguistic equality or inequality (which version comes first on road signs, etc.).

(5) Issues concerning the participation of members of an ethnic group in the society's political institutions broadly conceived.

Demands may be made by an ethnic group for some, proportional, over-proportional or exclusive representation in the society's political institutions - not just legislative but government, civil service, police, army, judiciary and government owned or controlled corporations. These may be concerned only with claims concerning society-wide institutions or they may include demands for autonomy for areas in which the ethnic group is strong, or the demand by others to reduce or eliminate such autonomy.

(6) Economic issues, over and above the 'job' aspect of (5): demands for anti-discrimination legislation about jobs conversely demands for job quotas

('Africanization'), licensing of traders, restrictions on land-ownership according to ethnic criteria, differential taxation, etc. etc. Where ethnic groups have regional bases, all kinds of questions about development funds, level of public services, etc.

(7) Issues involving other ethnically-based disabilities or advantages, either actual or proposed, such as residence restrictions, differential access to public parks, beaches, places of refreshment and entertainments, etc. The distinction between this and (3) is that although the (positive or negative) discrimination is based on ethnic criteria the advantages or disadvantages are of a kind that would count as advantages or disadvantages for almost anyone - they do not as it were have an ethnic content.

IV

I've so far talked about political divisions based on ethnicity but my eventual object in the paper is to compare ethnically-based political divisions with others. So I now need to say something at a more abstract level about the analysis of political divisions. The most general and abstract description of what we're dealing with is political divisions in a society - we can call them political cleavages in line with a common technical usage provided we understand that the depth and sharpness of the divisions is a variable and that we're not confining our attention to the sharp or deep divisions, or we can call them political conflicts provided we don't read anything too dramatic into the word 'conflict' and merely understand it as referring to the existence of a line which separates people by their position on some issue or set of issues (where an 'issue' may as we've seen simply be who gets a certain job). It's important to recognize that we are dealing with a political category here - not a psychological, sociological or economic one. We're talking about a facet of the actual political process in the society. In particular, we're not talking about three things with which this concept of political division can easily be confused.

First we're not talking about some notional ur-attitude which is then 'mobilized' or 'exploited' by politicians, whether this is conceived of as something that can be discovered by opinion surveys or by the curious antics of the Pearce Commission in Rhodesia. Political divisions as they exist at any time are themselves the products of the political process up to that point as well as the raw materials for its operation in the future. This is not to say that we can't identify latent political divisions in the sense of potential issues that might crystallize opinion around them - e.g. we might have deduced from xenophobia and reaction to coloured immigrants that there was a latent political division over racial issues in Britain before one actually appeared. But I don't think we should be seduced by this into thinking of a 'real' or 'underlying' cleavage structure which is either reflected or distorted by the 'actual' one, since this is a piece of individualistic metaphysics. What we should say is that at any time, given the existing political divisions plus the conglomeration of aspirations, fears, beliefs and expectations existing in the society some potential issues would more easily mobilize people politically to take sides than would others.

The general question how far politicians can create or suppress issues is of course a longstanding one - answers vary from the story of the French politicians dashing after a mob with the words 'I am their leader, I must follow them' to the image of the demagogue in whose hands the audience are putty. (Beerbohm's spoof Shakespeare play 'Savonarola' /^T'Savonarola Brown' in Seven Men includes a marvellous send-up of the common Shakespearean 'fickle mob' scene, in which a crowd (in which, Beerbohm directs, 'cobblers predominate' move in one page from shouts of 'Death to Lorenzo' to shouts of 'Death to Savonarola' and then a further half page after Savonarola has been addressing them they go back to 'Death to Lorenzo'.) The only point that I want to make on this is that whether or not a group can be led in a certain direction depends very much on what the alternatives on offer are. The more open the field for political entrepreneurs

the less room for manoeuvre any given leader has before he loses his following to someone else who tells them something more attuned to what they want to hear.

Second, we're not talking about cultural differences as such or about segmentation as such. (segmentation = institutional separation and low rates of interaction between groups). Differences of religion, say, don't in themselves constitute a political division, though they may form the basis of one if there is some issue which the adherents of the religions take opposite sides on. Similarly, the existence of segmentary groups does not guarantee that there will be a political division between the groups, though it (a) makes it likely that they will see much of politics in terms of group advantages and disadvantages and (b) makes it relatively easy for hostility between groups to build up, perhaps explosively, if once something - which may be quite trivial - sets it off.


However, as Horowitz points out in an interesting article. ('Multiracial Politics in the New States: Toward a Theory of Conflict', in Jackson and Stein) 'cultural differences may actually shield the groups from conflict by focusing their attention on quite different objects of gratification' (p.166) - thus in Malaya the rural Malays don't, he says, envy the Chinese their commercial success. 'The Chinese emphasis on economic activity is seen as excessively single-minded. It ignores religious values, and it requires sacrifices that prevent the maintenance of both ritual cleanliness and personal cultivation... There has not been much desire in the villages either to emulate or expropriate the Chinese' (p.170). Similarly, he points out, 'conflict in a plural society is not entirely the result of separation. If the groups were kept completely separate and members interacted only endo-culturally, there could be no cross-cultural conflict'. (p.166)

The net result of this is of course that in any situation where conflict between partially segmented groups exists (e.g. Ulster) there is a case for saying conflict would be reduced by decreasing the segmentation and for saying the opposite. On the one hand segmentation breeds a lack of common feeling and sympathy and allows harmful myths to multiply (e.g. that Jews in the ghetto boiled

babies), on the other hand separation does prevent them from getting in one another's hair. The balance may differ from case to case but in addition the answer may depend on the time span chosen: thus Jencks in Inequality suggests that school racial mixing may increase racial antagonism in the short run but decrease it in the long run.

Third, when we speak of political divisions we are not talking about inequalities as such, although inequalities when seen as illegitimate are of course a fertile source of grievances that may be expressed in political demands and thus form the basis of political divisions. Exactly in the same way as cultural differences do not constitute political divisions so difference between individuals or groups in their allocation of some valued objects does not constitute a political division. This is so whatever the valued objects are - whether they are material inequalities, inequalities in power or inequalities in social honour. Of course, the question under what conditions inequality gives rise to discontent has been a major theme of sociology and the question under what conditions it gives rise to political division has been central to political sociologists from Marx to Lipset and beyond.

It will be seen that in principle every political issue creates a political division. But when we speak of political divisions or cleavages in a society we intend to refer to relatively enduring divisions which apply to a whole set of issues and which indeed we can predict with some confidence will divide the society in future along the same lines in relation to issues as yet unformulated connected with some general matter e.g. schools. The logic of these enduring multi-purpose divisions has been articulated in Schattschneider's The Semisovereign People. I shall quote some sentences from his chapter on 'The Displacement of Conflicts'. 'Political cleavages are extremely likely to be incompatible with each other. That is, the development of one conflict may inhibit the development of another because a radical shift of alignment becomes possible only at the cost of a change in the relations and priorities of all the contestants.'



A shift from the alignment AB to the alignment CD means that the old cleavage must be played down if the new conflict is to be exploited. In this process friends become enemies and enemies become friends in a general reshuffle of relations. The new conflict can become dominant only if the old one is subordinated, or obscured, or forgotten, or loses its capacity to excite the contestants or becomes irrelevant.' (p.65) 'It seems reasonable to suppose that the more intense conflicts are likely to displace the less intense. What follows is a system of domination and subordination of conflicts. Therefore, every major conflict overwhelms, subordinates and blots out a multitude of lesser ones'.

(pp.67-8) 'Why do some conflicts become dominant while others attract no support? Dominance is related to intensity and visibility, the capacity to blot out other issues. It is related also to the fact that some issues are able to relate themselves easily to clusters of parallel cleavages in the same general dimension... Success depends also on the degree of dissatisfaction with the old alignment already in existence.' (pp.74-5).

One of the most obvious examples of the way in which this works is the American South, where the salience of the racial issue inhibited the development of politically articulated conflicts among the whites based on economic interests: planters versus rednecks or, later, in the industrializing areas, working class interests versus others. 'Within its predominantly agricultural economy, tremendous distances separate the planter and the tenant to form the base for a lively political conflict. Mississippi politics in the end reduces itself to a politics of frustration. As in South Carolina, when it faces the ultimate

consequences of its logic, the politics of the have-nots is quenched by contemplation of its bearing on race.' (V.O. Key Jr. Southern Politics p.230.)

Another obvious example is Ulster, where as Rose says 'The characteristics of Northern Ireland parties make them compete on issues that concern the survival of the regime. As long as the regime established in 1921 continues, the Unionist Party is expected to hold office. If the Nationalists or Republicans were to win, the chief change would be not in economic policies but in the boundaries of the state.' (p.234) The cleavage runs along religious lines. 'The two major parties are exclusive on religious grounds. 95 per cent of Unionist supporters are Protestants, and 99 per cent of Nationalist supporters are Catholics.' (p.235) The fortunes of the Northern Ireland Labour Party are instructive in this context, since they illustrate precisely Schattschneider's idea that one kind of issue will tend to obliterate another. 'The Northern Ireland Labour Party.... formed in 1949.... won no seats at the 1949 and 1953 general elections, when partition was a major issue. In 1958, it secured the return of four M.P.s; this has been the height of its strength. At the 1969 election two of its 16 candidates were successful.' (p.232) 'The intensification of anti-regime demonstrations in the late 1960s placed great strains on the Northern Ireland Labour Party because the party drew support from both communities... The refusal of the....Party to become involved in civil right alienated a number of its Catholic supporters. Paddy Devlin, the Labour Party's Chairman and Catholic MP from the Falls Road, left the party, thus halving its representation.' (p.233)

Less well known, perhaps, but extremely interesting in the present context, is the case of Belgium, in which the rise of the linguistic issue at the expense of the structured conflict among 'spiritual families' (Catholic, Liberal and Socialist) has had dramatic effects on political alignments. 'Flemish language and culture underwent a surprising renaissance in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. But, despite the fact that the majority of the population spoke Dutch, Belgium was being run by a Francophone elite which had created a


unified and centralized state after the model of France. This elite, which dominated in Flanders as well as in Brussels, opposed the Flemish revival as a threat to national unity and to their own position within the unified national structure.' (Dunn '"Consociational Democracy" and Language Conflict' Comp. Pol. Studs. 1972, p.9) Thus, in the nineteenth century especially, the primacy of the political division of the population along the lines of the 'spiritual families' inhibited the articulation of distinctive Fleming aspirations. In the 1930s, the linguistic question became more overtly politicized, with Flemish parties having some success and the other parties having to take account of Flemish demands, and 'a series of laws in the 1930s finally enacted a long-delayed equality for the Flemish language in education, administration, justice and the army.' (Lorwin 'Belgium' in Dahl Political Oppositions in Western Democracies, p.164) French, however, 'continued in national economic life and in the higher ranks of public administration to hold a predominance which, diminishing and precarious as it was, roused the opposition of many Flemings.' (loc.cit.)

The next act in the linguistic drama again illustrates the reciprocal relation of alternative line of cleavage. 'The Belgian school pact of 1958...ended the sharp conflict of the 1950s over the levels and conditions of state and to the Catholic secondary schools - an aid already granted at primary school and university levels - and established a general modus vivendi, with mutual recognition of the legitimacy of both public and Catholic schools. The pact immediately reduced the church's intervention in elections and the support by Catholic social organizations for the Christian Social Party, for it removed the strongest argument for separate Catholic political action and for Catholic political unity. The managers of the Christian Social party could soon experience the pertinence of Oscar Wilde's principle that there are only two tragedies in life - not getting what you want, and getting what you want.' (Val Lorwin 'Segmented Pluralism' Comparative Politics 1971 pp.163-4). The decreased intensity of the religious issue made room for the rise of the language issue. 'Once the school pact had

removed an essential cement of the Christian Social party's national structure, the old Flemish-French-speaking cleavage threatened that structure and the party's very existence. Similar, but milder, tremors shock the Socialist party and labour unions. The third of the traditional ideological parties, the Liberal party, reorganized itself in 1961, and ostentatiously renounced its century-old anticlericalism. Its success as a "catchall party" of the center and center right increased pressures for "deconfessionalization" within the Christian Social and Socialist parties". (p.171) Belgian party politics is now in process of realignment along linguistic lines. French and Flemish parties have gained up to a fifth of their respective catchment areas votes. (Dunn "'Consociational Democracy" and Language Conflict', Comp. Pol. Studies 1972, p.12) The three confessional parties have split into linguistic wings: 'There are now virtually three separate Catholic parties in Belgium, one Flemish, one Walloon and one Bruxellois. Each wing holds separate party conferences, elects its own officers, and often votes against the others when parliament considers important linguistic legislation.' In 1968 there were two Socialist lists in Brussels, one Flemish one Francophone, and 'by the end of 1970 the [Liberal] party was restructuring itself into three regional federations, and giving each federation veto power over policy positions of the "national" party.' (pp.13, 14)

Clearly, in evolving a general analysis of political divisions we need the concept of differential intensity cleavages but in other respects we cannot accept the simplicity of Schattschneider's views. In particular there are three ways in which we need to allow for more variation than he envisages. First, we must allow the possibility of more than one axis of cleavage not merely as a transitional phenomenon but as a fairly stable one. Even if we accept Schattschneider's view that lines of cleavage are competitors since fighting one with maximum effectiveness means suppressing or ignoring non-coincident lines of cleavage, there may nevertheless be a stand-off in the society, especially if some people are primarily interested in one line of cleavage and another set of people

in a different line of cleavage. Second, Schattschneider always presents his discussion in terms of dichotomies, with people being either for or against. But most issues have, at any rate potentially, a number of positions on them, often a continuum. What we want therefore is to plot the positions of people in relation to each issue - whether they take an extreme or a moderate position, for example. And, finally, 'intensity' on an issue has to be broken down to match the breaking down of the 'issue' itself into a series of possible positions. In general terms, 'intensity' here should be understood, I think, to mean how much it matters to someone that the outcome on the issue should be different from the one he prefers. But the amount someone cares about not getting his optimum need not be a linear function of the distance the outcome is from his optimum. Suppose, for the sake of simplicity, we go back to a case where only two positions are occupied and put distance on the horizontal axis, utility loss on the vertical. Clearly (1) is different in its implications from (2) though the average rate of utility loss is the same, since a compromise solution is much less costly to both parties in (1)



compared with their most preferred outcomes.

I should, incidentally, make it clear that 'intensity' must entail an 'interpersonal comparison of utility'. To measure 'intensity', because of methodological (or more precisely metaphysical) purism so that one can speak only of the relative salience of different issues for a given person and the relative attractiveness of different outcomes on a given issue (as above) results in nonsense. The main point about intensity is the amount that people perceive to be at stake, since this helps to determine whether they will rebel against

outcomes which differ from their optima, and so on. In the absence of a judgement by the observer (which can be perfectly objective and open to empirical evidence) some tacit assumption has to be made, and this is normally that there is some fixed total amount of 'intensity' to go around, which is invariant from one person to another and one society to another. Hence the prominence given to the 'cross-cutting cleavage' hypothesis: if there is a fixed lump of intensity then the only variation is in the way it is distributed, and so the effects of political cleavage will obviously be dissipated if it is chopped up between intersecting issues. Hence the deduction that since there is more cross-cutting between class and religion in Belfast than in Glasgow there should be less conflict. I would suggest that one should start from the other end by thinking in terms of the absolute levels of intensity on each issue. A high degree of cross-cutting is, I suggest, more plausibly seen from this viewpoint as a consequence of there being no issue with very high intensity rather than as a cause of it.

VI

I now want to discuss, using the analytic framework developed so far, the idea that what have been called the 'consociational' democracies of the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, Switzerland and post-war Austria provide a model for other societies with fundamental conflict, that is to say with divisions about public policy which separate the society into groups whose members share the same intense preferences on a whole range of issues, while the preferences of the different groups diverge widely. In particular, it has been suggested that 'consociational' techniques might make possible the non-coercive management of societies in which there are intense divisions on political issues based on ethnic diversity.

The current vogue seems to derive from W. Arthur Lewis' Politics in West Africa (Allen & Unwin, 1965), though he himself does not make the point explicitly. He does, however, say that the Anglo-American idea of a two-party system, with one

party forming the government and the other the opposition, is damaging to plural societies and advocates 'proportional representation, with all parties offered seats in all decision-making bodies, including the Cabinet itself'. (page 71)

'The democratic problem in a plural society is to create political institutions, which give all the various groups the opportunity to participate in decision-making, since only thus can they feel that they are full members of a nation, respected by their more numerous brethren, and owing equal respect to the national bond which holds them together. (pages 66-7)... 'The solution is...coalition and federalism. Any idea that one can make different peoples into a nation by suppressing the religious or tribal or regional or other affiliations to which they themselves attach the highest political significance is simply a non-starter. National loyalty cannot immediately supplant tribal loyalty; it has to be built on top of tribal loyalty by creating a system in which all the tribes feel that there is room for self-expression.' (page 68)

Lorwin, in his article on 'Segmented Pluralism' (Comp. Pol. 1971), picked this up and made the parallel explicit: 'As Sir Arthur Lewis has recently recalled, the Anglo-American experience (real or fancied) does not afford appropriate models to the leaders of plural societies of the 'Third World'. For such societies the "segmented integration" of some European democracies is of interest - an interest quickened by their being, like most African states, small in population and international power'. (page 174)

The most unequivocal statement of the thesis that I have come across occurs in Dunn's '"Consociational Democracy" and Language Conflict' (Comparative Political Studies, 1972): 'The existence of consociational democracy, as Lijphart originally formulated the concept, is dependent on the existence of cleavages (religious and class cleavages) which are becoming less and less relevant to succeeding generations. On the other hand, linguistic/ethnic cleavages are becoming increasingly important. There is no logical reason why consociational techniques cannot be used to resolve this type of conflict. In fact, it would be

surprising if they were not so used. The consociational techniques which helped some of the smaller European nations make the transition to modernity in relative peace and stability would certainly be applicable, mutatis mutandis, to the problems of developing countries such as Malaysia, Nigeria and India. And consociational practices may be or may become important in developed nations such as Canada, and non-democratic nations such as Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and even the Soviet Union'. (pages 32-3)

The term 'consociational democracy' was applied to the Western European politics I mentioned by Lijphart ('Consociational Democracy' World Politics, 1969), with a suitably catholic brace of references to 'Johannes Althusius' concept of consociato in his Politica Methodice Digesta' and David Apter's The Political Kingdom in Uganda. (page 211) In terms which echo those of Lewis, Hans Daalder says: 'It is significant that a term first adopted to analyse the development of a new polity in the Low Countries in the early seventeenth century, is now being revived in the study of comparative political development in the twentieth century. A process of building-up a new political society from below, to some degree by the consent of participating communities; in which deliberate compromises by elites carefully circumscribe and limit the extent to political power can be wielded by one political centre, may be a relatively rare political phenomenon. Yet it provides at least a significant footnote to the prevailing mood in the study of nation-building which so often proceeds from the assumption that nationhood should be forged from above, by the deliberate imposition of a "modern" state on traditional society.' (pages 355-6)

Lijphart's definition is as follows: 'Consociational democracy means government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy'. (page 216) I prefer Daalder's definition of 'consociation' as 'a certain pattern of political life in which the political elites of distinct social groups succeed in establishing a viable pluralistic State by a process of mutual forbearance and accommodation' page 355)

since this plays down the element of active collaboration as the essential defining feature. The position is, in fact, rather confused conceptually, and the point about active collaboration as against mutual forbearance and accommodation is just the tip of the iceberg. We can see what is at issue most clearly if we ask whether a loose federation (or confederation) is in itself a 'consociational' device when the different areas contain distinctive groups. On the one hand, its continued working in that form depends on mutual forbearance in the sense that the component parts of the confederation have to leave one another alone within the reserved areas of legislation and administration and not seek to override one another by capturing the central authority. On the other hand, to the extent that it does work smoothly it could be said to minimize the need for collaboration among elites representing the component areas, since it enables each elite to create public policies for the affairs of its area in a different way.

Less obvious as an alternative to active collaboration among elites from different groups is the encapsulation of the groups or, to use the Dutch term whose use has been generalized in recent years, verzuiling. Now verzuiling might be regarded as being, in its political aspect, a fairly close analogue to federalism. 'A zuil is a pillar. In the Dutch figure of speech, each of the nation's ideological groups is a "pillar", standing vertical and separate on its own base of religious or secular ideology. Each has its own party, socio-economic associations, press, leisure-time groups, radio and television broadcasting chain; and - in the case of Catholicism and two major forms of Calvinist Protestantism - its churches, parish leagues, and schools.' (Lorwin 'Segmented Pluralism' p.142) When I refer to the political aspect of this verzuiling I mean something specific: the way in which functions which elsewhere might fall within the province of a unitary state or a unit of a federal state are carried out by the zuilen. The state's role is either to withdraw from a sphere in which it might otherwise pre-empt action by others, to provide the groundwork of regulation, or actually to hand over tax moneys to the zuilen to administer (or as a variant of

this to put state sanctions behind the fund-raising of the zuilen). 'The bloc organizations...have been recognized and subsidized in the public or quasi-public authorities administering education, communications, social insurance, health care, and regulation of the labor market.' (Lorwin 'S.P.' page 172) Housing could also be added to this list. Obviously, as with federalism, this system requires forbearance, since each group has to allow the others to do things which (ex hypothesi) its own members regard as alien, offensive or immoral, and to the extent the groups are not separated geographically the strain will be greater. But it is also probably fair to say that it requires an element of active collaboration among the elites to keep it going, in a way that a loose federation does not. (This is leaving aside the need in both systems for collaboration on the matters left for the common government to handle directly.) The reason is, I suggest, twofold. First, because so much of life is organized on a geographical basis and 'external effects' are often localized, it is easier for an area authority to have a free hand in a wide range of matters without taking much account of what others do; and, second, because residence is something fairly fixed and objective it is relatively easy to raise taxes on residents in an area and thus localize the whole question of the financing of services run by the federal units. Taxing people differently according to their religious or other 'spiritual' affiliation is a good deal trickier and more open to abuse. It is easier to charge people the same and let them say who gets it (as with the Dutch radio and television set-up) but then a single rate has to be agreed on. And when it comes to schools, it seems to be accepted in all the countries that if the state is to use its taxing power to produce the money, there has to be some general formula for distributing the money according to the number of children in the various types of school rather than an earmarked tax. Thus the problem of allocation cannot be so readily avoided as in a federal system.

Nevertheless, it seems to me clearest to distinguish analytically between federalism (the parcelling out of state authority among areas), verzuiling in

public provision (the parcelling out of state authority among groups distinguished on some basis other than area) and collaboration. By collaboration I mean to refer to what has also been called proporz democratie or 'amicable agreement' (amicabilis compositio from the Peace of Westphalia). This implies proportional representation in the legislature, but much more than that. It does not require the Swiss practice (at cantonal and federal level) of including representatives of parties with perhaps 80% of the seats in the government, though 'oversized' coalitions are common, but it does entail that there should be 'greater weight on joint decision making and mutuality of rights and obligations than upon majority decisions and majority-minority alternations of power' (Lorwin S.P. page 152). 'Austria, Switzerland, and Belgium have carried proportionality into the civil service and the staffing of public corporations, as well as the agencies of administrative pluralism. The Swiss and Belgian systems naturally include recognition of language and regional or cantonal diversity in addition to religious-ideologic bloc representation' (ibid).

Thus, we have three dimensions on which we can array any polity. The three can to some extent vary independently and some systems are much higher on all three than others - compare Switzerland and Britain. The empirical connections are quite complex. For example, verzuiling requires a certain level of collaboration but also (compared with trying to run the system by bargaining over uniform institutions) reduces the need for a very high level. Again, Lorwin suggests that a highly centralized state would not - for ideological reasons - go with verzuiling; but he also admits that if federalism creates homogeneous units it reduces the need for (or the possibility of) verzuiling, as in Switzerland.

If we ask what these three dimensions are dimensions of, I think that in spite of all the dangers of equivocation, we have to say 'pluralism' - perhaps 'corporatism' would be suitable if Mussolini had not put his stamp on the word. 'Pluralism' in the relevant sense has been defined by Kuper as follows: 'the basis of the pluralism is racial, ethnic, religious, or other communities... The philosophy of pluralism rests on the conception that political societies

are not simply composed of individuals, but are constituted equally by intermediate communities whose political existence ought to be recognized independently of the citizenship of the members who compose them. Pluralism consists then in conferring juridical personality on these communities and recognizing them as corporations intermediate between the individual and the state, with political participation proportional to their numerical importance and constituting at the same time a real representation.' (Kuper in Kuper-Smith Pluralism in Africa, page 474)

The distinctive features of the small European 'consociational democracies' are not federalism (though this is notable in Switzerland, exists formally in Austria and is the wave of the future in Belgium) but the other two dimensions of pluralism. So if we want to know whether there are lessons to be learned from their experience it is on these features we must concentrate.

Historically, they arose (in the Netherlands and Belgium) when the liberal 'nation-builders' gave up the hope of unifying the country by assimilation (the equivalent of a contemporary 'mobilizing elite') and settled for bargaining relationships with the religious groups (Catholics in Belgium, Catholics and Protestants in the Netherlands). These bargains gradually took the heat out of the issues, especially the religious/secular issue until in the last ten years the 'pillars' or 'zuilen' have started crumbling in their political salience, and a process of ontzuiling - depillarization - has been occurring.

If we ask what are the conditions for this to work, we have to begin by discounting narrowly institutional features. Obviously proportional representation is a part of the system but it is not a cause of it - proportional representation was brought in because the parties had decided to operate consociationally, not the other way round. The crucial requirement is, as Lijphart has said, that the political elites should want to operate consociationally, and that their followers should let them and not run after rival anti-consociational leaders. They may want to for various reasons but I think we can boil them down to two.

First, they think they ought to. Thus Daalder, in an interesting article 'On Building Consociational Nations: the Cases of the Netherlands and Switzerland' has shown how 'consociational' ideas can be traced back several centuries in those countries. Second, no community with the power to disrupt the consociational system believes that it could win outright at an acceptable cost. This in turn of course depends on three factors: first the chance of winning outright, which is a function of relative sizes in a numerical democracy and otherwise on the power distribution; second, how much better a win would be than the sort of compromise that could reasonably be expected from 'consociational' politics, which depends for each partly on how close to its optimum the compromise solution could be expected to be and partly on the shapes of the utility curves for departures from the optimum; and, third, how costly a fight for outright victory might be expected to be, which depends on such things as whether outside domination of the country would result, how great a cost the disintegration of the country would be seen as, and so on. Thus, to give a few examples, consociation is more likely in a representative democracy if no single group has a majority - this was true in Belgium and the Netherlands, but not in Austria after the World War II, where consociation at least partially broke down when the 'big coalition' was ended by the Christian Democrats. Consociation is also more easily achieved if there is an obvious compromise position which no party finds too bad: thus on the schools issue, each group could regard controlling its own schools paid for by the state as a reasonable fall-back compared with having an all-Catholic or all-Secular system. The relevance of the last consideration is pretty clear: the low countries are obviously highly vulnerable and the beginnings of the modern 'consociational' system coincided with the increasing international tension before World War I. Austria, without either traditions of compromise or an inability of one group to win power outright, shows that the third factor is enough by itself if the situation makes it really potent - after World War II when the Socialists were invited to join the government though the Catholics had a parliamentary

majority, the international situation was dramatized by the presence of the Russian and Western occupying forces, while the appalling internal consequences of uncontrolled dissension were still vivid in everyone's mind.

VII

Where does all this leave us on the question with which we began: the relevance of 'consociation' for ethnic politics? The answer, in completely general terms, could hardly be other than banal. It is, I think, (1) that there is no general reason why divisions based on ethnicity should not be dealt with consociationally but (2) that in many particular instances the demands made by or on behalf of the different ethnic groups are inherently incompatible with consociation either each in itself or (even more often) when all are taken together. Thus, I come back to my earlier point that 'ethnic politics' is a descriptive term but not a significant analytical one. If we could specify fully in terms pitched at the appropriate level of abstraction under what circumstances consociational politics is possible, we should then be able to see that ethnic politics sometimes fulfils those conditions and sometimes (more often) not. In order to keep the rest of the paper within bounds, however, I shall stick to examples from ethnically divided societies.

The essential point about consociational politics is that it requires a fundamental agreement among the main political elites if not to collaborate actively in the long term at least to collaborate on setting up federative or verzuiling institutions and thereafter to let them run their course. But where there are intense and divergent preferences on ethnic issues it is often just

this fundamental agreement that is lacking. Unless some or all groups are prepared to retreat from their maximum demands to the point at which agreement can be reached, consociational politics is out of the question.

Thus, there can be no agreement at this fundamental level if one ethnic group wants a completely independent state for itself while another group wants to keep it in a combined state; or if one wants to attach the territory to another state while another group wants independence; or any variation on these (Biafra, Ulster, Cyprus, etc.). Again, federation or verzuiling requires that a group or coalition of groups which is capable of exercising power in a unitary, centralized way (in a democratic system because it has a reliable majority) should be prepared to allow another group or groups to exercise power, to tax themselves for their own purposes, and so on. (W. Pakistani response to E. demand for loose federation; KANU opposition to KADU demand for loose federation in Kenya, etc.)

Because of the connection between ethnicity and modern claims to statehood, disputes about the boundary itself are quite likely when we have ethnic politics. This is quite commonly so in the newly-created states: 'Ethnic and racial groups that are widely-embracing in their identities are more nearly comparable to nation-states than to other domestic groupings based on class, profession, partisanship or religious affiliation. As Clifford Geertz remarks, these communally structured collectivities can be considered "as possible self-standing, maximal social units, as candidates for statehood". (Rothchild 'Ethnicity and Conflict Resolution', reprinted in Jackson and Stein Issues in Comparative Politics, p.181.)

Again, ethnic groups in close enough proximity to form part of the same state usually got there by a process which generated inequality at the outset - conquest of the indigenous population by an invading group or the importation of a subordinate group in the form of slaves or indentured labour by a dominant group (which itself had usually conquered and killed or displaced the population). Given this background, it is hardly to be expected that the groups should either

collaborate on a day-to-day basis or even agree on a formula of federation or verzuiling to allow them to operate separately. Wherever one group wants inequality and another equality, or both want inequality but each with itself on top, there is no basis for consociation until one or both moderate their claims.

The importance of this comes out especially poignantly if we look at a case where the 'ethnic' line is simply defined in terms of racial (meaning here colour) discrimination: that of negroes in the U.S.A. (West Indians in Britain may also partially fulfil this criterion, especially second and subsequent generations - though they would still presumably have some residual identification with Barbados etc.) Especially until a decade or so ago, one could say that black Americans were simply Americans who experienced systematic and massive discrimination. They were not in any significant way culturally distinct and their separate identity was not one chosen by them but one imposed on them to their disadvantage. As Cox (Caste, Class and Race) said in 1947. 'The urge toward assimilation and away from group solidarity is so compelling among Negroes that few, if any, of the organizations maintained by whites which offer reasonably unrestricted participation to Negroes can be developed by Negroes for Negroes. As a rule, only those types of white enterprises which discriminate against Negroes can be developed among Negroes. If the white society were to be impartial to Negro participation no business, no school, no church would thrive among Negroes.' (page 546) What the Negroes wanted then was to integrate - to be treated the same as whites - and this was exactly what the whites were against. As Cox said 'the attitude of whites and Negroes is not similar but opposed. The racially articulate whites feel that they must guard their exploitative advantage (not specifically their occupation) for exclusive enjoyment, while Negroes are seeking increasing cultural participation.' (pages 452-3) Clearly, there was no basis for 'consociation' here.

Cox drew a contrast between Negroes and Jews which is, I think, illuminating: 'Anti-Semitism is an attitude directed against Jews because they are Jews, while

race prejudice is an attitude directed against Negroes because they want to be something other than Negroes. The Jew, to the intolerant, is an enemy within the society; but the Negro, to the race-prejudiced, is a friend in his place... The intolerant group welcomes conversion and assimilation, while the race-prejudiced group is antagonized by attempts to assimilate.... We want to assimilate the Jews but they, on the whole, refuse with probable justification to be assimilated; the Negroes want to be assimilated, but we refuse to let them assimilate.' (393-401)

It seems pretty clear that there is more chance of reaching a 'consociational' relationship with a group which doesn't want to assimilate (even if it is regarded as alien in some ways) than with a group which wants to assimilate but is repelled. To the extent that Negroes have moved away from the description of them just given, towards 'black is beautiful', black studies, identification with Africa, distinctive movements such as the Black Muslims, and demands for control of (black) neighbourhood schools, they are making themselves more available for the particular kind of corporate bargaining embodied in 'consociation'. The stumbling-block, however, remains in the shape of white determination to stay on top, rather than to accommodate Negro aspirations for a share of power.

Having said all this, we need to ask: are there really any examples of ethnically-based consociational politics, or is it an 'empty box', possible in principle but not occurring in reality? At this point lack of detailed knowledge on my part becomes an embarrassment, but I shall offer some observations even if they are extremely sketchy and tentative. Looking round the world we might first take Communist regimes. Obvious example of ethnically-diverse states are Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union and there is both decentralization (especially in Yugoslavia) and some sort of conscious ethnic balancing at the centre, but the position of the Communist party in these countries is clearly not compatible with consociational democracy and severely limits the extent to which one could speak of consociation at all. (In principle, of course, the Communist Party could simply be the vehicle for inter-ethnic bargaining but it is not my

impression that this would be an accurate portrayal of these countries.)

Outside the Communist areas we may divide the world into three groups of countries: rich, medium and poor. The poor countries mainly consist of the states of Asia and Africa which have mostly achieved independence since 1945. As I have already pointed out most of them are ethnically divided in the most extreme sense that identity with the state tends to be weak or non-existent but identity with ethnic groups strong. Although (as in the ethnically-diversified Communist states) there is some sort of ethnic balancing act being carried on in some one-party states such as Kenya, there are as far as I can see no consociational democracies on the Lewis model (which we are treating as an ethnic version of the Lijphart model) that is to say states in which there are elections in which the parties represent ethnic groups and these parties collaborate in the government. On the contrary, where there are elections and the parties stand for the distinctive interests of ethnic groups, as in Sri Lanka (Ceylon) and Guyana (British Guiana), the winning party behaves in a way which is the antithesis of consociational.

The middle-ranking countries include the better-off countries of the Middle East and Latin America and the poorer European ones - Spain, Portugal, Greece, Turkey. They are not as a group ethnically diversified to a very great extent - partly as a result of forcible assimilation, population transfer and genocide in the past, and partly because (unlike the African states) their boundaries reflected ethnic forces from the start. They are also not as a group democratic. Chile is clearly a non-consociational set-up in which the primary cleavage is on class lines. Uruguay had a sort of sequential consociationalism in which the two parties agreed to alternate in power. This is obviously an interesting case for the student of consociation but was a way of avoiding internecine conflict based on non-ethnic divisions. The Lebanon is, however, the showpiece of ethnic consociation in that the top positions are assigned by agreement so as to share them between representatives of the Christian and Muslim communities (which I take it can be regarded as ethnic groups since so much hangs on this difference). Political

parties however do not (as in the standard consociational model) articulate the interests of the communities but rather (as with the U.S. 'balanced ticket') each party list has a spread of candidates in its slate and this is indeed prescribed by law. Although it has been maintained (as was said of the French 'house without windows') that the energy and attention of politicians is absorbed by the political game as played in these terms and the system is incapable of coping with problems of planning, etc., it does seem to be a genuine example of 'accommodation' among ethnic groups to maintain a state against the odds.

Third, there are the rich countries of Western Europe, North America, Australasia and Japan, all of which have representative institutions of government. There is relatively little ethnic diversity within them, and this is itself a tribute to the power of ethnic divisions since it is the result of centuries of assimilation, unification, splitting up and redrawing of boundaries, all based on either the creation of ethnic identities to coincide with state boundaries or the reorganization of state boundaries to coincide with ethnic identities. The most important examples of ethnic diversity are Canada, Switzerland (assuming that the linguistic groups should be reckoned as ethnic groups), Belgium (where the Flemings - and now by reaction the Walloons - can reasonably be counted as ethnic groups) and Ulster (though this is of course strictly only part of the United Kingdom). The U.S.A. clearly has a politically salient division on racial lines, but among whites the distinctions are of enormously less significance than any of those mentioned so far and rank somewhere with (though very different from) Welsh, Scottish and English identification vis-à-vis identification with the U.S.A. and Britain respectively.

In only one of these countries are the parties divided along the lines of the ethnic division, and that is Ulster. In Belgium, as we have noted, the parties are de facto split into ethnic sections, but when cabinets are being formed it is still the parties (based on 'spiritual families') which join or do not join coalitions rather than the ethnic sections. Lorwin, with true 'consociational'

instincts, has suggested that the trouble with the linguistic issue is that it has escaped control by the elites and thus found its way on to the streets and that the realignment on an ethnic basis is hopeful in that it will make it easier for explicit bargaining to take place. If so it will be the only case in which ethnic polarization has not meant an intensification of conflict. The Swiss consociational system at the federal level takes as the unit of representation in the executive parties based on the 'spiritual family' type of division, and in Canada it might well be said that such 'consociational' bargaining as takes place at the federal level between French and English occurs in the Liberal Party. In the U.S.A. the blacks (at federal level and locally outside the South - even, increasingly, inside it) are a recognized part of the Democratic coalition, but they are of course only a part of it: one could hardly say that American politics divide into a black party and a white party; rather, in a way slightly similar to the Canadian Liberals, the 'accommodation' occurs insofar as it does at all within the Democratic party.

I did not deal with federation in my round-up because, as I pointed out earlier, this is not a distinctive feature of the countries which have been picked out as 'consociational democracies'. But clearly it can work in such a way as to take some of the strain, provided always that the ethnic groups forming the units are prepared to 'forbear' sufficiently. Thus Canada would pretty obviously have had a much stormier history without the safety-valve of Quebec, Belgium may be able to achieve a similar uneasy equilibrium, and Switzerland is of course a byword for the defusing of conflict by allowing local autonomy.

If we turn back to the phenomenon of 'consociation' (or its absence) within a unit of government, one point does seem to emerge which is worth pondering. If we take the paradigm of 'consociational democracy' in its classic form to be a system in which each 'spiritual family' forms a parliamentary bloc and the elites of each 'family' collaborate, we can say that there is no case in which this applies where ethnic divisions are substituted for 'spiritual' ones. Systems

(Sri Lanka, Guyana, Ulster) in which the parties represent ethnic groups are, so far from consociational, systems in which the tensions between the groups are exacerbated by the parties rather than damped down and in which there is no co-operation between winners and losers to stabilize the system. Conversely, where there is ethnic 'accommodation' within a single political unit this takes place either by all (or most) parties running 'balanced tickets' (Lebanon, U.S.A. among whites), by parties being in effect confederations of ethnic sub-parties (Switzerland, Belgium) or by an ethnic minority forming a significant part (but only a part) of the strength of one party (Canada, blacks in U.S.A.). Why this should be I don't claim to know but it looks as if there is something about ethnic divisions which makes them too explosive to form the primary basis of division among political parties. Thus, even if we accept that the general idea of 'consociation' in the sense of bargaining among groups has relevance to ethnic politics, it would appear that the distinctive feature of the Lijphart-Lorwin model - that the primary divisions should be translated into party divisions - is not valid where the primary divisions are based on ethnic identification. Rather, the parties have to at least go through the motions of disagreeing about something else, leaving the inter-ethnic bargaining to go on within the parties. Cross-cutting cleavages ride again!