

Manchester paper

Offered to say what I've been doing in last 2 years (with 3 months out altogether for Liberal Theory of Justice).

Trying to produce a piece of old-
-sort of thing people used to write.

fashioned political theory. Before anyone

says it's a big undertaking let me

get in first & say that with about

300,000 words typed up and more to

go I'm well aware of that fact. &

also that ~~my~~ what I come up with is
only going to scratch the surface.

Indeed, it's clear that the reason why

nobody's done it lately is that it can't

be done — our modern standards of

rigorous argument and reference to data

(which is all too available) conspire to make



any attempt fall short. Nevertheless, I think it's worth doing if you're willing to see yourself within the division of academic labour. To put it crudely, even being shot ^{down from all directions} ~~at~~ has some functions.

• is ~~shot~~ if it does anything to induce others to bring their expertise to bear on the same problems.

As I see it, the ~~classical~~ agenda of ~~the~~ what we now call ^{classical} the political theorists (though at the time they were also the political scientists) was about right. That is, given some notion about what constitutes a desirable condition for human beings to live in, what



political institutions have the best chance of bringing about and maintaining those desirable conditions?

(Complications :

(1) best political institutions for any society, or best given nature of society (in relevant (or 'degree of civilization') respects — culture / econ condⁿ, popⁿ, area, etc)

(2) 'nature of society' may be itself treated as modifiable by political action, so that pol instⁿ may be judged partly by effect on making possible other pol instⁿ ⁱⁿ ~~more~~ in future.)





Point is that this still seems to
And I think pol sci only makes sense as related to B.
me OK as agenda. ~~But this~~
Doesn't mean everybody has to address themselves to all agenda all time.
But problem is to keep it in focus at
all, against the competing attraction of
achieving intellectual control of some area
● by cultivating it intensively even at
the cost of losing sight of the original
point of studying B.

(1) pol theory - 'public choice'

meetings. Orig public economists interested
● in finding why prescriptions of welfare
about budgeting etc
economies/ didn't work, pol scientists and economists
trying to use tools of ec to look at
basic problems of pol. Now sterile
scholasticism - has become a 'field'
with internally-generated topics, graduates



students brought up on this as a field
Analogy with, say, molecular biology doesn't hold ^{of} ^{the} ^{idea} ^{of} ^{politics} ^{because} ^{it's} ^{not} ^{an} ^{intellectual} ^{exercise} ^{but} ^{rather} ^a ^{practical} ^{one}

(2) empirical pol sci, ^{less} ^{practical} ^{at} ^{least} ⁱⁿ ^{sense} ^{that} ^{eg} ^{Hobbes} ^{was} ^{practical} ^{to} ^{be}
confident about, my feeling is it's

not in such bad shape, since ~~that~~
At best there
is some attempt to talk a common

● language and ask common questions.

But still, because of absence of
a theoretical basis, generalizations remain
implicit — comparisons made on an ad hoc
basis tho' with some unstated rationale.

● At worst, compilation of information which
nobody wants to know (except to pass
exams etc)

✂

What's answer? The idea of
producing branches of 'hypotheses'



and then begin seeing whether they're true in the case of 150 states or subset of them. Too blunt an instrument - doesn't allow for fact that states do differ and that

• we are interested in the particularities.

Seems to me only answer is at three levels: at the highest level to operate with some kind of general apparatus that can be developed so as to apply to

• says what the basic concepts are going to be and the way in which they're ^{to be} related; then you need to run up some models

which capture what seem to be the ^{most} salient features of a

processes that occur in a number of political systems; and then, thirdly, you ^{adapt} apply these to particular cases, where possible by explicit ad hoc theoretical development and otherwise by what's expressively known as 'hand-waving'. (That is, saying 'To the extent that the real case deviates in this sort of way then it changes things something like this ?')

More ramshackle than Sir Karl Popper but I suspect not so dissimilar to the way the 'real sciences' actually develop. Unified deductive theory is a



be put on
hard shell that can only ~~grow~~
when the body itself has stopped
growing. (With politics, the
phenomena themselves keep changing
so it seems likely ~~that~~ at the
• best more sensible to keep the
urge to systematization in check
if it gets in the way of
continuously changing the theory
to keep up with the ~~real~~ reality.
• However, that's an entirely moot
choice at the moment.

#

Obviously, many alternative
conceivable kinds of high-level
theoretical approach. Right follows



out implications of society ^{as an analogy to an} ~~Law~~

organism of or a political system

as an ~~cybernetic~~ analogy of

a rocket-guidance system or a

thermostat. But for my money

the best bet is to stay much

nearer to a common-sense

understanding of the key features

of politics. When people are actually

trying to explain what's going on

somewhere what are the common

terms in which they do it?

Actors (people, organizations etc)

who have goals of some kind.


They try to realize these goals

which may bring them into conflict

with one another. If so which actor or coalition of actors prevails is explained by the resources that the actors have and the structure (more or less governed by rules)

● that determines what you have to do to win.

Obviously, ^{this outline} can be filled in to any extent required (I do have an essay of amounting to a short monograph showing how it's possible to crank out a general model of a political system out of this.) But all I need to go on is assent to the idea that this does reflect a plausible




u/
way of explaining things.

E.g. Ulster in last couple of weeks. Take the various groups (UK gov^t, 2 groups in Ulster exec, Ulster Workers Council)

● ask what their aims were, what their options were - what events they were able to control - and what the effects of interactions among these choices would have been. If

● we assume primary aim of UWC was collapse of power-sharing exec, we can see the events they could control - bringing the life of the Province to a standstill - were sufficiently coercive to ensure (given



the need of the SDLP and Unionists
to maintain electoral support in future)
to ensure that one or other would
have to withdraw whatever was done,
thus bringing about the collapse.

#

This isn't intended to be anything
new - in fact point is it's fairly banal.

(Contrast :

1) social organism developed a malfunctioning
subsystem

2) cybernetic machine developed a fault in
the steering mechanism

3) inputs into the system produced too much
stress)

#



Qix

If this general way of looking at politics seems reasonable, ask whether there is any formal structure which represents it.

Answer - theory of n -person non-zero-sum games.

Theory of games - concerned with strategic interactions

n -person — obviously must allow for more than 2 parties

variable sum - must allow for all kinds of situations from those of pure ^{co-ordination} ~~coordination~~ cooperation (what suits a best suits b best too in terms of outcomes to each)



to pure conflict (the more a likes
an outcome the more b dislikes it),
passing through the more usual
intermediate possibilities.

N.B. zero-sum in general

- unsuitable for politics. Hence inappropriateness
of Riker's 'theory of political coalitions'
based on n -person
which is zero-sum games. (It
doesn't produce good predictions about political
coalition-formation either.) If Riker
were correct that pol is zero-sum,
all that it does is redistribute. No
'value added' by politics. This is
a description of pathological rather
than normal politics. Normally sharing
political decision-making provides an aggregate

5/ If you had to choose ^{between} Riker's idea that pol in general zero-sum & Parsons' that it's in general a ^{use}co-ordination game, (power used for pursuit of common social goals) Parsons wd be nearer truth surplus over a condition of anarchy of But there

is also of course ^{always} potential for dispute over

how the surplus is to be distributed ~~and~~

given coercive power of the state more than

the surplus can be put into the kitty -

• some people can be made worse off than in

absence of political system. So we get

back to point that politics is a

variable-sum game with possibilities of

both conflict & co-operation.

#

To say 'It's all in n-person

variable-sum game theory' is rather

the same sort of statement as 'It's

all in Aristotle' or 'It's all in

Marx. It's consistent with it that you

☺

should have to do a lot of work to get what's 'all in it' out.

3) In fact, the theory of n -person variable-sum games in its most general form is fairly disappointing. Doesn't in general have well-motivated equilibrium solutions, which is really the guts of any theory of this kind. Does this mean that it's a bright idea but no practical use? No because it ~~still~~ forms the basis of more specialized developments, where we specify the situation more precisely and add further details about the motives of the actors, the ~~and~~ constraints on their actions etc.

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Thus, it is, I think, genuinely illuminating to observe that

* Mancur Olson Logic of Collective Action

* Garrett Hardin's 'Tragedy of the Commons'

● * Hobbes' basic argument for a sovereign in Leviathan

* Adam Smith's 'hidden hand' in the form of the free market are all app specifications to particular kinds of situation.

of the general form of

n-person non-zero-sum game.

known as the generalized Prisoners'

Dilemma.

~~is~~

(i.e. all have characteristic that

in absence of outside coercion or moral constraint, each of members of a group are led to get an outcome they like less (or worse) than if they all behaved differently)


There are three

Particular developments of n -person non-zero-sum games that I want to

make use of today: (1) Theory of preference-aggregation
(2) theory of party competition (3) theory of coalition-formation
(In each case when I say 'theory of' this is shorthand for 'a mess of more-or-less well developed bits of theory'.)

(1) Theory of preference-aggregation.

General form - suppose we know preferences of a bunch of people for outcomes L (public policies) and then produce a 'social outcome' (a single public policy) somehow based on these, what rules for getting from individual prefs to collective decision ~~produce~~ bring about what outcomes (the rules need not be operationalizable - we could imagine them being applied by God if we wish).



We can then ask whether the outcome produced by some rule satisfied various postulated criteria.

The whole business can be brought into a much more overt relⁿ with n -person non-

• zero-sum games if we add that each person in the collectivity attaches values

to the various possible outcomes; so that

any given collective decision produces a

unique distribution of gains and losses

• ~~to~~ ~~the~~ among the people concerned. If these values are interpersonally commensurable, thus


~~this~~ makes it clear that one outcome

may produce a greater net benefit

than another summed over all the members

Thus obviously is in strongest sense a variable-sum game of the group. \angle If we stick to ordinal


prefs, all we can say is that this outcome is put first by so many people, second by so many



people, and so on. But unless ~~one~~ outcome X is ~~at~~ no lower ^{on} for anyone's ranking than outcome Y and higher on at least one person's, we can't say X produces more overall satisfaction than Y . [19a]

(2) Theory of party competition. Various ideas concerned with strategic interaction of two kinds of actors — parties and electors. Most powerful parts of this are developed for cases where ~~these~~ the preferences of both kinds of actors can be represented ⁱⁿ ~~as~~ the same n -dimensional space — especially where $n=1$. And I shall in fact refer only to ^{the case of one or at most two dimensions} this kind of case, which I don't think this is an absurdly

Before going on, make 2 observations about the property of the median posⁿ in one-dimensional space of preferences for outcomes.



Shown by Duncan Black

a long time ago that if all alternatives in successive votes, paired w median posⁿ will beat all others.

And actual voting systems do have general tendency to produce median as outcome

2. Median posⁿ minimizes ^{av.} distance of all those concerned from the chosen outcome, whatever the distribution of preferences along the line.

(Intuitive proof =

suppose a lot of people ~~along a~~
standing along a line — you
start from the median person (the
person with as many each side of
him) and go to one side or
the other. As you do so you're
moving nearer some people and an
equal distance away from others.
But ex hypothesi you're moving
away from more people than you're
moving towards.)

Also for symmetrical distribution of
prefs. around mid-point, 2

further properties :
(a) minimizes the maximum
distance away of ~~the person~~ any

19c

person. No posⁿ can get the
furthest person closer.

(b) Very close to posⁿ that
maximizes equality of distance i.e.
no deviation from an distance
away.

(Qual - of single pos^{ns}. But
because of complementarity of
outcomes mixed outcomes may
be unwanted by all.)

NB distance is only distance.

But if we can say distance
has same significance in terms
of value for all, we can turn
these conclusions into ~~the~~ terms of

relative gains & losses. (Relative to most preferred posⁿ.) That is to say, if everyone loses the same amount of satisfaction from the same distance between desired &

• actual outcome, median posⁿ minimizes aggregate loss of satisfaction.

And with symmetrical distrib of pref minimizes greatest loss of satisfaction & is due to equalizing loss of satisfaction.

~~X~~



unrealistic constraint for large-scale directions of public policy I want to deal with.

Normally 2 basic assumptions in this —


(1) electors vote for party nearest their own most preferred political position (when more than one dimension 'nearest' requires interpretation, but leave that)

(2) parties try to maximize number of votes cast (proportion of votes cast, number of seats, probability of winning etc)

Attempt then made to show how these interact, given some system turning votes into seats.

I don't want to suggest / party theory of

competition is any great shakes — in fact it's quite a mess.



2/1

The one bit everyone knows is the proof by Hotelling (popularized by Downs) that with one dimension + two parties (+ various assumptions like no abstention) the parties converge on the position of the median voter.

- This is (in game-theoretic terms) a saddle-point: for the parties L ~~it~~ ^{the situation} reduces to a two-person zero-sum game, and the strategy of adopting the median position is ^{It's a stable equilibrium: if} ~~one that~~ a maximin strategy for each. L we take a posⁿ where each party is adopting it. ~~If each~~ L adopts it, neither can move away from it without losing votes to the other.

Unfortunately, ~~if~~ none of this works if there are more than two because there's no mechanism to space them out; parties on one dimension ~~and~~ and in general

the outcome with more than one dimension is entirely indeterminate. Even with two parties there's no equilibrium pair of positions for most distributions of preferences once we go beyond ~~say~~ one dimension. And of course there's nothing in the theory that says how many parties there are going to be

The problem in all this is the

This doesn't entail the whole thing is hopeless. But it's clear that we need ~~some~~ more elaborate specifications of the game — some ~~reason~~ why parties are born and die

organizational or financial constraints on the creation of parties, for example. Above all, I

3
think the motivating assumption for the behaviour of parties is defective.

Even in the one case where the two axioms do produce a ^{definite} result - the two-party one-dimension case - I'm

inclined to believe that the correspondence between the theory and the observed

reality ~~for~~ of two-party ~~to~~ systems (the trend towards moderation, struggle

for the middle ground) provides spurious

support for the theory in its present form. For it so happens that

in this case (unlike a multi-party case)

the behaviour of parties run by ideologues

~~for~~ would be exactly the same,

provided the preferred posⁿ of one party was

one side of the median and the preferred posⁿ of the other party the other side of the median. ~~The~~ All scientific testing is of the fallacy of (of course) affirming the consequent

$P > Q$; Q therefore P . But the


● point here is that ⁱⁿ the one case where the theory produces definite predictions the same predictions would be generated by the alternative hypothesis that the parties were trying to achieve particular outcomes, (as identified as posⁿs on the one dimension).

2 good reasons for ~~use~~ replacing the vote-maximizing assumption with, and for replacing it with one specific alternative assumption, namely:

5/
each
[party seeks to take part in a government
as close as possible to its own preferred
position, and its ~~opt~~ official pos^{tn} depends on
the result of that calculation.


1/ Multi-party systems are a ~~not~~ reality -
nearly all
most countries with parliamentary systems are
multi-party systems. [In fact out of
W Europe, Canada, Australia, NZ, only
NZ has a pure 2-party system.] This
can't be explained by vote-maximizing assumption,
but can by the proposed assumption.

2/ More important - there is strong
evidence that once an election is over
and the parties have to form a
government, they tend to behave in a
way that only be explained by some such

6  motivational assumption. (This is to anticipate my discussion of coalition-formation $\&$ in a moment.) It's therefore highly plausible, it seems to me, that the same assumption should underlie the prior stage of the political process.

Obviously, can't say what ^{motivational} this assumption will lead parties to do at the electoral stage. In any case, nobody (including me) has worked out the implications of this for party strategies in elections in a rigorous way.

But in general (provided the electoral system is reasonably proportional) ^{I think that} the best thing for a party to do is to take a stand on the position it really prefers.



(We could complicate it further by having factors in the party (but enough's enough.)

to avoid unnecessary complications,

Anyway, for the present purpose, I'm ^{number and} you prepared to take the positions of the

parties as given from outside the theory.

We simply say that there are parties with various platforms

and we'll see how things work themselves

out from there. All I'm going to

use, then, out of party competition theory


is the idea that the ^{each} voters votes for whichever party is nearest his own position.


This again, it should be said, is not an

obviously plausible assumption once we get

away from a two-party system. You

recall that when talking about





preference-aggregation I said that the line would lie to assume that people attached value to getting the outcome of collective decision-making they most wanted, and less value to other outcomes.

- Reasonable to carry this forward to present case & say what voters really attach value to is outcomes — each voter wants an outcome as close as possible to that he most likes, and his vote is aimed at bringing that about.

Again, in the absence of any idea about how coalitions form in a legislative parliamentary system, this produces an indeterminate decision. But given (e.g. anticipating (once more) the next move —

coalition formation - it is in general true ~~and~~


that (in a reasonably proportional electoral system) ~~the~~ voting for ~~of~~ the party nearest your own position does ~~give~~ improve the chance of getting an outcome

near your own preferred one, however other people/votes ^{may cast their}. (This last clause is important since otherwise the whole thing reduces to a guessing game.)

③ Formation of government coalitions.


(Given distribution of party strengths & rule that gov^t requires majority support in vote or investiture and to survive, what gov^t forms.)

Question is what criteria govern this. Again 2-party case is degenerate theoretically.



All theories, whatever their basis, predict in a two-party system the party with a
that if one party has a majority it will
form a government by itself. (Not always
true but quite powerful prediction ^{Some of} kinds
of case in which not true (Austria after
● 1945, where Christian Democrats had
majority over Socialists) will be mentioned
at the end of this talk. More
generally, if one party has a majority,
it forms gov^t.

Question arises where no party has
a majority. I've already mentioned
in this context
Riker's 'size principle', which is derived from
the idea that the spoils of office are
fixed (cabinet posts) and each party
wants as much of them as possible. In



(though this is not derivable from the rest)

In this zero-sum game it's assumed that parties will share out the spoils in ratio of size. If accepted, follows that parties with smallest aggregate surplus over bare majority will form coalition. A + C in example:

	A	B	C
	30	40	30
AC	60		
AB	70		
BC	70		

I mention this theory because it's obvious that it comes out the same bag as the idea that parties seek to maximize votes. The two aren't completely compatible but both depend on the idea that parties have no interest in policy as such. What they're interested in is the spoils of office; policy stands are

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a means to winning seats but once election is over policy plays no part in coalition-formation.

Point I want to emphasize is that there's nothing in the structure of

~~in-person non-zero-sum~~

the theory of games (or more generally the analysis of strategic interaction) that requires such assumptions. We can equally

well assume that parties are concerned

to implement policies, and we then simply attribute value to that.

*

This whole question of coalition-formation has been tested pretty rigorously for (a) European parl systems in a

couple of recent pieces of work:

Taylor & Laver 'Govt Coalitions in Western Europe'
(EJPR 1973)

De Swaan Coalition Theories + Cabinet Formations

Can go into what they did & what they found if desired.
Both of these show quite conclusively
that Riker's size principle doesn't work
at all, nor do other theories that
ignore positions of parties. The adage
that politics makes strange bedfellows isn't
borne out. The theories that stand
up - and do remarkably well in fact -
predict that ideologically contiguous
parties will tend to form.

Various complications here, which
I'll gloss over:

34
1/ Ordinal / interval

Ordinal - if ABCDE, A to D

more than A to C, but can't

compare A to B with B to ~~E~~. D

Interval - assign distances between parties.

In both tests, simple assumption

made that all \neq distances equal.

So A to B less than B to D.

2/ Open / closed.

Minimize range : keep distance (whether
ordinal or interval measurements) / as
between extreme parties

small as possible. So if coalition
from B to D is possible (= majority)

that precludes A to D or B to E.

In itself this doesn't say anything

about intermediate parties.

Closed: Minimize range, subjects include all parties within range. (Minimum connected winning coalition of Axelrod in Conflict of Interest.) Thus, in example,

● ~~ABC, AC~~

A	B	C	D	E
30	5	30	5	30

(on ordinal or equal interval basis)

minimum range is A to C and C to E.

● The closed minimum range hypothesis says the coalition will be ABC or CDE.

Open: (or at any rate non-closed)

Minimize range, exclude unnecessary parties within that range.

This predicts AC or CE.

Closed minimum range does slightly better but only because of the fact that in Italy the tiny Republican party has ~~supported~~ been regarded as a necessary part of many gov^ts even

● the ~~dist~~ ~~never~~ ~~requires~~ it never makes the difference between a winning & losing margin of seats for the coalition.

Since it's so close we can say

● both forms are reasonably well supported.

But obviously somewhat different motivational assumptions about party behaviour are required to underwrite them.

This is another area of theoretical underdevelopment - nice thesis in this for someone. Obviously general idea is that

the closer the parties in the gov^s are to one another the easier they find it to co-operate, to agree on a common programme etc. But this still doesn't represent a deduction

from specific motivation. Precise argument still to be made. And then the choice between the two versions opens up.

Closed : Axelrod derives from 'conflict of interest', but his proof that putting in the intermediate parties reduces

'conflict of interest' isn't valid in general, though it may still be true in most actual cases. But it's still not

clear whether reducing^{av.} dispersion of

party pos^{ns} really constitutes a reduction of conflict of interest in any reasonable

sense. Surely range between extremes main thing.

Open : ~~reqs~~ if parties only interested in minimizing range, then whether or not you have in unnecessary intermediate parties doesn't matter. If unnee parties to be squeezed out, you need to say that at margin parties are interested in spoils of office and don't want to share them gratuitously.

(But alternative is to say parties

hardly ever exactly on one dimension, (i.e. hardly ever a party whose policies lie exactly between those of 2 others) so adding extra parties, even if they do lie between others that have to be in, does really increase the ideological spread of the coalition - there is some extra element of policy to cope with.)

For now I'm content to back off
 this and say it's enough that if
 parties are interested in policy, the
 minimum range theory in some shape
 or form ^{looks} quite plausible as an
 ● implication of strategic interaction in
 coalition-formation.

###

Now time to put together the 3
 ● elements.

on issues wd tend to
 (1) Direct voting ~~wd~~ produce
 outcome at median posⁿ. And
 noticed interesting & potentially
 evaluatively-relevant features of
 median posⁿ.

A0

Putting together (29) and (3)

I want to suggest that we get
the answer that the median
elector is fairly close to the
programme of the government.

Two stages.

Electoral stage. We're assuming each
elector votes for closest party to himself
(in terms of its platform). If so it
follows that ^{party that} the median voter ~~will~~ votes
for ~~the~~ will turn out to be the
party containing the median legislator.
(Call it the median party. N.B. we
assume parties are ideological monoliths
so median legislator is any member of

∴ 11

median party chosen at random.) Put it
other way round: median party will
have been supported by the median
voter.

2 party case easy: party voted
for by median voter gets more votes,
wins more seats (if system proportional),
thus contains median legislator.

In multi-party case not so
obvious but I'm satisfied it's so
even tho' don't have formal proof.

Coalition-formation stage

Again 2-party case easy. Party
with maj forms gov^t - thus party
voted for by median voter controls

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gov^t programme. Obviously this doesn't
itself guarantee that party winning
is near median voter - but (a) it
must be nearer than the other one +
(b) force of party competition (whether
vote-maximizing or - in special case
of 2-p^t case - ideologically-motivated)
drives parties towards median posⁿ.

Again ~~mult~~ multi-party case more
complicated, except where one party
has majority of seats. Same
argument then applies - must have
been voted for by median voter. &
And in multi-party system surely one
of other parties likely to be near median
voter, so the maj party must be even closer.

In other situations, any of a number of coalitions of minimum range may be available on basis of given distrib of seats among parties, esp if we apply ^{only} ordinal measurement.

But NB were not interested in it for own sake at present but ^{only for effect on} ~~the~~ outcomes of public policy-making.

Generally thought that if we can't predict what coalition forms, we can't say anything about policy. But I don't think this is so.

We're assuming parties bargain about policy - but if so we shd take note of relative bargaining strengths of parties:

If coalition must be closed minimum range, then it must contain

the median party. **If** median party won't join, there can be no government.

This is simple logical necessity.

Whether we start from leftmost party & move right, or rightmost & move

left, or start further in ^{and go in either or both directions} we must include the median party to make up a coalition with a majority of seats.

Suppose we relax this & say that open minimum-range

coalitions can occur. This opens up possibility that there may be minimum range coalitions not including the median party. In fact, when you get down to it, quite hard to

cook up a case where this does occur.

I. very much doubt whether empirically

there are more than a handful

of cases ~~that~~ where the median

party has been ~~an~~ expendable. ~~members~~

of a

Example:

A	B	C	D	E	F	G
10	10	26	8	26	10	10

You need 7 parties to produce a case where (on interval scaling with equal intervals between parties)

the minimal range coalition from which

the median party can be omitted

is definitely predicted.

In this example, 3 coalitions which are minimal range ordinally: ABCD, DEFG and CDE. Of these C(D)E is the minimal range on an interval measurement.

What can we say about such cases, ~~except that~~ beyond that they're rare?

1/ ~~2~~ there must always be ^{at least} two minimum-range coalitions including the median party ~~and is~~, on ~~ordinal~~ ordinal measurement, however tiny the median party is (even if only a handful of seats). Viz all parties on one side of it plus median party, and all on other side + median party.

And 2/ any minimum range coalition not including the median party, must include at least one party either side of B. (This must be so logically since all parties on one side ~~of~~ of the median excluding median itself can't add up to a majority - that's what we mean by saying it's the median party.)


Thus, in example,

ABCD DEFG — have D as their one common element

CE — is simply the two parties either side of D.

~~11~~

We're therefore justified in saying that the median party is in a strong bargaining position when coalition policy is being made. Go back to original five-person case, but now parties.



ABC BCD CDE : all contain C.

Thus, if A and B want a policy too far to the left, C can go to D and E and say 'Rather than have policy ^{substantially} to left of C, ~~because~~ how about coalition with policy just to right of C. And if BCD coalition has been formed ^{with policy at C} B (say) can't

press for move to left because E can be substituted on right, and so on.

N.B. strength of the C position: first C indispensable for min range coalition. Second (really showing why

min range plausible) suppose parties did leave out C - ABD, BDE.

Where wd common policy be? Again have to be near C, esp since

if too far away (eg to left with ABD), know that C & can trump it by offering D as a CDE coalition.

This point of straddling the C posⁿ also applies to case where C can be left out of min range coalition: as we've seen posⁿ still tends to be near C.

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Thus, bargaining posⁿ of C plus
its location
plus fact that it lies athwart other
possible coalitions, combine to suggest
C location will be near outcome.

Of course, Free Dems + Social Dems
not exactly same as Free Dems +
Christian Dems. But in both cases
they do have the ability to limit
what gov^t does by virtue of
poss of teaming up with other
big party. *Stubbards* [50a]

#

Go back to evaluation. Median
sounds good. But is it really?

In fact we can't say much in
general about it. Minimizing an
distance from most desired outcome is

50a

*

This produces a sort of rationale for a representative political system. I quite disagree with de Swaan, ^{who,} in the conclusion of his book, maintains that his findings about coalition formation demolish the rationality of electoral politics. This seems to me a piece of 'new left' dogma imposed on rather than growing out of the study.

In fact it provides the essential basis for establishing a link between voting choice and final policy-outcome. Suppose for example Riker's 'minimum size' theory had turned out to be true. There ~~would~~ ^{governing} The ~~positions~~ of composition of the coalition would depend on the arbitrary and

506

accidental fact of which coalition had the minimum number of seats over half - whether this was mainly left parties, mainly right parties, mainly centre parties, or parties from different ends of the spectrum. Policy would be a by-product of this process of coalition-formation.

Moreover, and crucially, it would be impossible for a voter to know how to cast his vote. Suppose ^{even if} that he abandoned the attempt to vote so as to increase the prob of his preferred posⁿ being the outcome. (since ~~the~~ ^{He'd have to do that} process by which policy is made when parties are concerned, only with spoils of office is indeterminate even when we know the composition of the government.) Suppose

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instead he simply takes the view that
it must be ~~his~~ ^{thing} good for the
party nearest his own position to be
in gov^t coalition. So he wants
to vote so as to increase prob of
his party being in gov^t. ~~Unless~~
clear that he should vote for his
it is on the margin of getting
over half the seats. { In which ^{this} case
it clearly helps to push it over
the margin since it will then
form gov^t single-handed, whatever
rest of results are. But otherwise,
marginally increasing size of preferred party
may or may not increase prob of
being in gov^t. Adding a seat
may make it too big - i.e. it

50d

may mean that it is no longer part of a minimal size coalition

A	B	C
39	20	41

A B forms.

A	B	C
41	20	39

B C forms

Thus if voter is closest to A and succeeds in swinging seat from C to A ~~its~~ he produces result that (on Riker's theory) A no longer an eligible coalition partner for B. Thus nobody can vote sensibly unless he knows how everybody else will vote.

De

If coalitions of minimal range form, these nightmares disappear. The policy is (for reasons I've ~~are~~ set out) likely to be in the region of the party containing the median representative. And this enables the voter to make a rational choice of party without needing to know how ~~the~~ other people are going to vote.

For we can say that, whatever the distribution of votes among the parties may be, it can't hurt ^{if the results of his casting his vote is} to give the party nearest his own position an extra seat.

If it would be the median party anyway, it remains so and may change from an excludable party in a minimum range coalition to one that has to do

So the simplest is that the extra seat makes his own preferred party the median party, which is fine. included. If it wouldn't otherwise be

the median party, there are two possibilities. The ~~one~~ ^{other} possibility still is obviously that this preferred party ~~isn't~~ remains not the median party after gaining an extra seat.

And this must be so if it wouldn't

~~be~~ isn't contiguous to the party

● that would otherwise be the median party. But even then he can't

do better than ~~not~~ give it an extra

seat. For either the median party remains

the same as before, ^{changes so as to} or it becomes the party adjacent to ~~it~~ ^{the previously median party} in his own

preferred direction.

90

(99 seats)

	↓				
A	B	C	D	E	
			30	25	
			4		
	25	20	25	25	
189	15	15			

50g

Suppose result is as in example.

D is median party. Now suppose our voter (who ~~supports~~ wants median ~~as~~ party as near as possible to B) can shift seat.

If he shifts ^{the seat} it from D or E to B, he moves the median from D to C.

A	B	C	D	E
19	16	15	24	25
			25	24

But what's even more important is that if ^(an extra seat) voting for B won't

If he moves it from A or C then it doesn't alter the outcome - median stays at D

50h

A	B	C	D	E
19	16	14	} 25	25
18	18	15		

But even more important is the fact that he doesn't have to think strategically. ^{Either sitⁱⁿ is balanced} If an extra seat for any of the parties on his side of the ^{otherwise} median will shift the median one party to his side. In that case it doesn't matter which he votes for (A B or C) - but voting for B will certainly do the trick.

Conversely, if an extra seat for any of the parties his side of the ^{otherwise} median won't shift the median, then again it doesn't matter

50i

which party the extra seat goes to.

A	B	C	D	E
18	15	15	26	25

- So again he need have no regret in voting for B.

Property of median (as against e.g. average) that it's ~~affected only~~

- ~~by the number of~~

it's insensitive to the overall distribution. An extra seat on the left of the median instead of the right has the same effect whether it's ^{a shift} from far left to of it to just left of it, or ~~of~~ just ^{right} left of it to

50j

just left of d, or whatever.

In other words, tho' it may seem a counter-intuitive statement, there's no way in which someone might be able to move the median towards his own posⁿ by ^{adding a seat} ~~voting~~ for a party other than the one nearest him except where he could equally well move it towards him by ^{adding a seat to} ~~voting for~~ the party nearest him.

Conclusion -

Voting stage and coalition stage interlock so as to produce a rational connection between elector's vote and the ~~pol~~ programme of the cabinet. But of course shd be careful not to read too much into this. *

5

not saying much. But to say more we have to know what the issues are, what the median posⁿ represents, what the distribution of prefs is and whether equal distance does mean equal loss of satisfaction to all concerned ('intensity')

This means moving on to next stage, constructing models intended to cover salient points of groups of countries, and then extending them to apply to particular cases. This is in fact the great bulk of what I've ~~just~~ written & what I was intending to talk about when I gave my title 'Collective Choice &

5

Conflict. just sketch it.

2 kinds of society — those divided on ethnic, linguistic, racial, religious lines into groups (communal groups) with sharply opposed preferences for public policies, and those not so divided.

Characteristic issues — in first society issues affecting the relations between the communities, symbolic & material discrimination etc. In second society left-right issues (i.e. issues of haves vs have nots). [Reversing Alford's Party & Soc^y — he suggested class questions wear the trousers, and communal questions only get to centre

of stage as class issues decline.

Typical watered-down Marxism

of much pol sociology - derived

here from Lipset. In fact, surely

other way round. You only get

into vertical issues in a serious

way ^{once} if/ the communal issues have

been settled at least to ~~some~~

~~degree~~ the point of bringing

about a modus vivendi. Primordial

ties connect people living together,

sharing all kinds of cultural


experiences & identities. As a basis

for cleavage have (appalling) ability


to shove cleavage based on posⁿ in

order of economic stratification out
of the way.)

Characteristic distributions of preference Stratification



Communal



• Significance of median thus quite different. In first case, few very dissatisfied, and those on both sides of actual outcome. Evaluating in terms of 'good life' likely to be mildly redistributive policy, given usual distribution

5
of income & wealth.

In second case, one community very pleased with outcomes, other (minority) community very displeased. From 'good society' it, likely to be oppressive and to provoke resistance, leading to a good deal of violence, and greater repression in future (of one side by the other, whichever wins).

Cycle of movement apart in community preferences responding to and responded to by the dynamic of electoral competition.

Parliamentary systems with communal cleavage

Ulster
Ceylon (Sri Lanka)
Guyana

X

56

Clearly median outcome not desirable
in such cases. But can only be
avoided by aborting 'natural' majoritarian
tendency of parliamentary system.

Cases - ~~Vers~~ Netherlands (settlement before
1914 war)

Austria post-45

Venezuela post-56

Lebanon since foundation

Usual analysis of this seems to
me to seize on the epiphenomena
rather than the core phenomenon
itself. Usually observed that in
these cases you have what has
been called in Ulster context
power-sharing - or elsewhere the principle of the
proportz. And it has been observed

that this in effect institutionalizes
a veto by both sides over changes
in communal relationships (In
Austrian Red-Black coalition this
was actually ~~inserted~~ built in as
well as meticulous proportion.)

But this is ~~miss~~ the continued
manifestation
consequence = the guarantee if
you like - of the ~~continued~~ process
of accommodation, it isn't the key
to it. In itself mutual veto
simply means each side can
assume itself the status quo.
But while this may be some
comfort to minority, in that it
prevents them being made worse off,

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it doesn't do anything to deal with
consequences of earlier political
the / oppression or of de facto inequality
that may have developed under the
cover of state neutrality. Thus,
the essence of the whole thing
is a deal which comes at
the start. We always find
such a deal. The proporz
and mutual veto then underwrite
the deal but the deal itself
has to be created.

political of decision-making can &
Thus, [institutions] ~~don't~~ themselves
avoid the problem of communal
conflict. There has to be
a will on the part of the
elites representing the communities

to reach an accommodation — and 59

lack the ability to persuade or
by authority or coercion
obtaining the acquiescence of their

followers. The conditions for this
in game-theoretical terms are (1) that both sides should
tends to be experience of a
stand-off in a civil war, or

+

~~that~~

recognize the situation as a
Each would not like a sitⁿ in which the other conceded its goals
prisoners' dilemma, ~~in which both~~
but in practice the choice is for both to lose (both
sides ~~lose~~ by pursuing their goals

beyond a certain point, or (2)
~~that the majority~~

vigorously or one pursuing and the
other resisting) or for both to
gain relatively to that by co-operating.

This requires

(a) actual stand-off in civil war

(b) takeover by dictator as result of inability to reach accom before

(c) fear by one or both sides that dissension (or disaffection of minority) liable to lead to state being swallowed by another.

Suggests why circ in Ulster (Hindsight - but on basis of analysis it did use the words at the beginning of January during the euphoric phase.) not encouraging of direct rule not to both,

unpleasant enough & Republic not

fearsome enough to scare

Protestants; and in civil war

Prots believe (with good reason)

they could win.

£