BIT THAT'S BEEN KEPT

Notice, however, that parallel to this is another arrow marked 'power over subjects', which runs likewise from 'Powerful actor(s)' into the 'Subjects' box. Why should you care about power over subjects, from a political point of view? (You might, of course, be interested in power over them as a way of getting things you want them to do directly, but that is outside the scope of the present survey.) The answer is that there is (we are assuming) a large overlap between subjects and voters. If power over subjects translates into voters' decisions about the identity of rulers, then power over subjects is also indirectly power over rulers. For the voters' power to determine the identity of decision-makers is, as I

government would lose electoral popularity unless it acceded to the truckers' demands. This manoeuvre was successful to the extent that the French government caved in, and the other governments that stood firm did lose support. The British government, for example, lost its lead in the public opinion polls for the first time since the last election and is now making promises of significant concession. government would lose electoral popularity unless it acceded to the truckers' demands. This manoeuvre was successful to the extent that the French government caved in, and the other governments that stood firm did lose support. The British government, for example, lost its lead in the public opinion polls for the first time since the last election and is now making promises of significant concession.

FIGURE 4.2


1
A demands that B maintain the status quo
A does nothing
2
3
B maintains the status quo
END (status quo continues)
(A1, B1)
B changes status quo
END (B chan
status quo, A
nothing)
(A0, B2
B complies with A's demand
END (status quo continues)
(A1, B1)
B does not comply
4
A does nothing
END (B changes status quo, A does nothing)
(A0, B2)
A punishes B
END (B change status A punishes B)
(A-1, B0)

FIGURE 7.1


RULER(S)
DECISIONS (LAWS AND PUBLIC POLICIES)
STATE APPARATUS
POWER OVER SUBJEC
(ENFORCEMENT OF DECISIONS
SUBJECTS

TABLE 2.1

A	B
A to W, B to N	A to N, B to N
A to N, B to W	A to W, B to W
A to W, B to W	A to W, B to N
A to N, B to N	A to N, B to W

(W = wide valley, N = narrow defile)

TABLE 2.2

A \ B	To N	To W
To N	−2, +2	0, 0
To W	0, 0	−1, +1

TABLE 2.3

A \ B	To N	To W
To N	−20, +1	+5, −10
To W	+5, −10	−8, −2

TABLE 2.4

		B: To N	B: To W
A	To N	−8, 8	0, 0
	To W	0, 0	−4, 4

TABLE 3.1

		B: Drive on right	B: Drive on left
A	Drive on right	1, 1	0, 0
	Drive on left	0, 0	1, 1

TABLE 3.2

		B: Drive on right	B: Drive on left
A	Drive on right	2, 2	0, 0
	Drive on left	0, 0	1, 1

TABLE 3.3

		B: Mexican	B: Chinese
A	Mexican	2, 1	0, 0
	Chinese	-1, -1	1, 2

TABLE 3-4

A	B
Both Mexican	Both Chinese
Both Chinese	Both Mexican
A Mexican (B Chinese)	B Chinese (A Mexi
A Chinese (B Mexican)	B Mexican (A Chin

TABLE 3.5

A \ B	Clean	Not clean
Clean	1, 1	0, 2
Not clean	2, 0	−1, −1

TABLE 3.6

A	B
A not clean, B clean	A clean, B not clean
Both clean	Both clean
A clean, B not clean	A not clean, B clean
Neither clean	Neither clean

TABLE 3.7

A \ B	Swerve	Not swerve
Swerve	1, 1	0, 2
Not swerve	2, 0	−1, −1

TABLE 3-8

A	B
$999 to A, $1 to B	$1 to A, $999 to
$998 to A, $2 to B	$2 to A, $998 to
⋮	⋮
$2 to A, $998 to B	$998 to A, $2 to
$1 to A, $999 to B	$999 to A, $1 to
0 to A and B	0 to A and B

TABLE 3.9

A \ B	Co-operate (C)	Defect (D)
Co-operate (C)	1, 1	-1, 2
Defect (D)	2, -1	0, 0

TABLE 3.10

A	B
A plays D, B plays C	A plays C, B plays
A plays C, B plays C	A plays C, B plays C
A plays D, B plays D	A plays D, B plays D
A plays C, B plays D	A plays D, B plays C

TABLE 3.11

		B: Not confess	B: Confess
A	Not confess	1 year, 1 year	10 yrs, Free
	Confess	Free, 10 yrs	5 yrs, 5 yrs

TABLE 3.12

A	B
A confess, B not confess	A not confess, B confess
A not confess, B not confess	A not confess, B not confess
A confess, B confess	A confess, B confess
A not confess, B confess	A confess, B not confess

TABLE 4·1

A \ B	comply with A's demand (b_1)	not comply with A's demand (b_2)
do nothing (a_1)	1, 1	0, 2
punish B (a_2)	(1, -1)	0, 0

TABLE 4·2

A \ B	comply with A's demand (b_1)	not comply with A's demand (b_2)
do nothing (a_1)	1, 1	0, 2
punish B (a_2)		-1, 0

TABLE 6·1

A \ B	Co-operate	Defect
Cooperate	1, 1	
Defect		0, 0

TABLE 8·1

A	B	C
x	y	z
z	x	x
y	z	y

TABLE 8·2

A	B	C
x	z	y
y	x	z
z	y	x

FIGURE 2·1



FIGURE 3·1



FIGURE 4.1


1
A makes demand
A does nothing
(A 0, B 2)
END (status quo continues)
2
B complies with A's demand (b1)
(A 1, B 1)
END (A does not punish B)
B does not comply with A's demand
3
A does nothing (a1)
(A 0, B 2)
END (status quo continues)
A punishes B (a2
(A -1, B 0)
END (B does not compli
A punishes B)

FIGURE 8.1

FIGURE 8.2

FIGURE 8.3

FIGURE 8.4



FIGURE 8.5

FIGURE 8.6



FIGURE 8.7



FIGURE 8.8


x versus y
1
All vote 'sincerely'
A and C vote for x
x wins
C votes 'insincerely', others 'sincerely'
B and C vote for y
y wins
x versus z
y versus z
2
3
A and B vote for x
x wins
A and C vote for z
z wins

FIGURE 9.1



FIGURE 9.2



FIGURE 10.1